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Abstract
Restaurant prices in the Euro area saw an unprecedented increase
after the introduction of the Euro. We argue that this increase can be
explained by an extension of commonly used models of sticky prices
due to menu costs. This extension involves the state-dependent de-
cision of ﬁrms on when to adopt the Euro. Two main mechanisms
drive the result. First, our model concentrates otherwise staggered
price increases around the introduction of the Euro. Second, before
the adoption of the Euro, prices do not reﬂect marginal cost increases
expected to occur after the changeover. This “horizon eﬀect” disap-
pears as soon as the new currency is adopted, contributing to a jump
in prices at that time. Calibration of the model shows that it gener-
a t e sab l i pi ni n ﬂation of the same magnitude observed in the data.
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11 Introduction
Before the introduction of the Euro coins and bills in January 2002, many
feared that the changeover could give rise to excessive price increases. As
it turns out, according to an investigation by the European Commission,
the increase in the overall Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices attribut-
able to the introduction of the Euro was only between 0.12% and 0.29%.
Although the aggregate price index saw little or no increases, prices in par-
ticular sectors, most notably restaurants and cafés, increased at a historically
unprecedented rate in the three months after the Euro coins and bills were
introduced.
In January 2002, the annualized monthly price increase in the Euro area
restaurant sector was 15.63%. In the same month, several countries saw
price increases in their restaurant sector that went far beyond that: Germany
(28.80%), France (18.75%), Finland (26.11%), and the Netherlands (50.05%)
are the most extreme cases. These increases stand in stark contrast with the
moderate restaurant price increases observed in the EU countries that did
not adopt the Euro, the U.K., Denmark, and Sweden.
What could explain such remarkable restaurant price increases in response
to the introduction of the Euro? Did restaurant owners use the introduction
of the Euro as an opportunity to collude and raise prices? This seems fairly
unlikely. The restaurant sector in the Euro area is a sector largely popu-
lated by small family-owned businesses. Explicit collusion between the many
restaurant owners across all the countries in the Euro area seems to be a
far-fetched scenario. Of course, as suggested for example by Adriani et. al.
(2003), collusion between restaurant owners in the Euro area might have
been tacit. The introduction of the Euro might have led them to coordinate
a switch from a low-price to a high-price equilibrium. Though not impos-
sible, such a multiple equilibrium story can only anecdotally explain why
it was the introduction of the Euro that caused this equilibrium switch. A
third theory emphasizes the importance of pricing points in the switch to the
Euro. However, if pricing points are important in the restaurant sector, then
why didn’t they lead to comparable price increases in sectors that sell units
of smaller amounts, like supermarkets?
In this paper we claim that there is another explanation for the price
increases in the Euro area restaurant sector, namely the existence of menu
costs. Where else would menu costs be more applicable than in the restaurant
sector?! In fact, evidence in Bils and Klenow (2004), as well as in van Els et.
2al. (2002) suggests that restaurant prices are among the most sticky prices
observed.
Our explanation relies neither on the assumption of multiple equilibria nor
on that of pricing points. Instead, it is based on an extension of commonly
used sticky price models to the adoption of the Euro. These sticky price
m o d e l sf o r mt h eb a c k b o n eo ft h em o d e r nd y n a m i cv e r s i o no ft h eI S - L M
model, also known as the New-Keynesian model. They are a crucial part
of the microfoundations underlying the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve, as
discussed, derived, and estimated in, among others, King (2000), Clarida,
Galí and Gertler (2000), Sbordone (2002) and Woodford (2003).
Our main assumption is that the introduction of the Euro in January
2002 forced all restaurants to reevaluate their prices to adjust to the new
denomination. Price adjustments that might have been further delayed, or
anticipated to a few months prior to January 2002, all happened together in
(or right after) January 2002. We include this assumption in four variants
of a general sticky price model, which we modify to take into account the
adoption of the Euro. Given appropriate parametric assumptions on the fric-
tions that prevent ﬁrms from continuously adjusting their prices, our general
framework readily specializes to some of the sticky price models most popu-
lar in the literature. This encompassing approach to the modeling exercise
requires some notational set-up costs. This initial investment however pays
oﬀ in terms of expositional simplicity and, above all, by making the models’
calibration immediately comparable.
In particular, we will consider Calvo’s (1983) time dependent model, a
hybrid of Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980), and the state dependent model
in Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999). In these three models we assume that
all ﬁrms have no choice but to adopt the Euro in the month in which it
is introduced. As it turns out, this assumption implies a price increase in
January 2002 that is much higher than that observed in the data.
The fourth model we consider then is an extension of Dotsey, King, and
Wolman (1999), which incorporates an endogenous adoption decision of the
new currency. In equilibrium, this implies a gradual adoption of the Euro
o v e rt h ec o u r s eo ft h eﬁrst few months of 2002, which more accurately mimics
the observed adoption process. For reasonable parameter values, this model
generates a blip in restaurant price inﬂation of the same magnitude observed
in the Euro area. Three main mechanisms generate this blip.
The ﬁrst, which we call ‘distributional churning’, produces a concentra-
tion of otherwise staggered price changes at the time of the adoption of
3the Euro. While in normal circumstances only a fraction of ﬁrms would be
changing prices in any given month, everybody must reprice in January 2002.
This produces a price jump on that date, followed by a protracted period of
lower than average inﬂation, as the distribution of price vintages “churns”
back to its steady state. The second mechanism, which we call the ‘horizon
eﬀect’, is determined by the fact that the prices set before the changeover
do not include any of the increases in marginal costs anticipated to occur
afterwards. Before January 2002, the price reoptimization that accompanies
the changeover is a probability one event. Therefore, cost increases expected
to occur after the changeover do not feature in ﬁrms’ present value calcula-
tions before that time. The prices set at the time of the switch, however,
do include those costs. This has two eﬀects on adopting ﬁrms. First, on
the extensive margin, it gives them an incentive to postpone changing their
price in the periods immediately preceding January 2002.1 Second, on the
intensive margin, the “horizon eﬀect” leads adopting ﬁrms to increase their
prices at a much higher rate than their counterparts that do not. Finally,
the third determinant of the inﬂation blip is the way in which the incentive
of an individual ﬁrm to raise its price is inﬂuenced by other ﬁrms’ pricing
decisions. This is a form of “strategic complementarity”.
These results have important policy implications. They show that the
adoption of a new currency is not necessarily neutral in a monetary sense
and that the degree of non-neutrality depends on the time span within which
ﬁrms are allowed to adopt.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present
the evidence on the anomalous price increases in the Euro area restaurant
sector in, or around, January 2002. In section 3 we introduce our theoret-
ical sticky price framework. We show how the anticipated introduction of
the Euro can be included in a general model of sticky prices that nests the
four models of sticky prices and menu costs mentioned above. The general
model that we introduce is a partial equilibrium model for a small sector.
The equilibrium in this sector is assumed not to aﬀect the path of macro-
economic aggregates. We choose this setup because the introduction of the
Euro seems to have had negligible eﬀects on the aggregate price level but has
had a big eﬀect on the prices in the restaurant sector. We discuss the main
mechanisms that determine the equilibrium path of prices and inﬂation in the
1This extensive margin is shut down in the time dependent models because the timing
of price changes is exogenous.
4small sector in Section 4. It is in this section that we introduce the concept
of ‘distributional churning’ and the ‘horizon eﬀect’, which are the two most
important driving forces behind our results. In section 5 we show that, for
realistically calibrated parameter values, the model with endogenous adop-
tion of the Euro generates a blip in inﬂation that is remarkably similar in
magnitude to that observed in the data. Section 6 concludes. Mathematical
details are relegated to Appendix A.
2E u r o p e a n i n ﬂation and the introduction of
the Euro
In the run up to the introduction of the Euro, the European Commission
noted that the
‘...public is increasingly concerned that it will be subject to abuses
during changeover and there have been complaints in several
countries about abusive price rises both in the public and in the
private sector’
(Commission for the European Communities (2001), page 4)
Even though the Commission itself deemed the risk of price rises
‘... broadly speaking, very slight or non-existent’
(Commission for the European Communities (2001), page 4),
several policy measures were put in place to prevent such price rises from
happening. These measures included member states committing to convert-
ing public tariﬀst ot h eE u r oi nan o n - i n ﬂationary way and the signing of an
agreement by representatives of traders and consumers, guaranteeing overall
price stability during the transition to the Euro.
In this section we present evidence on the extent to which the changeover
to the Euro in January 2002 was accompanied by any discernible anomaly in
the behavior of prices and inﬂation. We will do so in two steps.
First, we show that the general price level in the EU12 - the so-called
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, or HICP2 - did not experience any
2Diewert (2002) explains the conceptual framework underlying the HICP.
5signiﬁc a n tj u m pa r o u n dt h ec h a n g e o v e r . T h es a m ei st r u ef o rt h eo v e r a l l
price levels in each of the 12 Countries that adopted the new currency.
Second, we show that this aggregate evidence hides anomalous behavior
of prices in particular sectors of the economy. The sector with the most
profound anomaly in inﬂation dynamics in January 2002 is the restaurant
and café sector, which is the focus of this paper. We present evidence on how
the behavior of inﬂation in the restaurant and café sector in the countries
that converted to the Euro deviated from its historical behavior as well as
from that in countries that did not adopt the Euro.3
2.1 The general price level
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the EU124 HICP log-price level and monthly
inﬂation rate from January 1995 to March 2004.
We report the non-seasonally adjusted series here for two main reasons.
First and foremost, we are looking to uncover unusual jumps in inﬂation
concentrated in the ﬁrst few months of 2002, corresponding to the introduc-
tion of the Euro. If present, such jumps would most likely be smoothed out
by seasonal adjustment methods. Secondly, the disaggregated series for the
restaurant sector that we will be looking at next are also only available in
non-seasonally adjusted form.
As is evident from the ﬁgure, nothing remarkable happened in or around
January 2002. The inﬂa t i o nr a t ei nJ a n u a r yw a sa r o u n d2 %a n di n ﬂation
peaked in March 2002 at around 8%, but very similar peaks recurred in each
March since 20015.
3While conducting the background research for this paper we looked quite extensively
at the disaggregated EU12 price data. Of the approximately 100 categories of goods and
services at the most disaggregated level made available by EUROSTAT, only “restaurants
and cafes” and “hair salons” showed any evident price spike in or around January 2002.
4The EU12 countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Eurostat’s harmonized CPI for
the Euro-zone is compiled using country weights based on each country’s share of private
ﬁnal domestic consumption expenditure in the Euro-zone total. The EU HICP series
includes Greece only since 2001
5What is noticeable is the increase in the volatility of inﬂa t i o ni nt h eo v e r a l lH I C P
for the Euro area starting in January 2001. This is accompanied by a more pronounced
seasonal pattern, with peaks in the ﬁrst and fourth quarter followed by troughs in the
middle of the year. This increase in inﬂation volatility is apparently due to changes in the
way sales are dealt with in the construction of the overall price index. See Lünneman and
Mathä (2004).
6Of course, the aggregation of the underlying national inﬂation rates into
the monetary union’s aggregate might very well hide a signiﬁcant degree
of national heterogeneity in the eﬀect of the changeover. This turns out
not to be the case. In all countries in the EU12 price movements in or
around January 2002 do not clearly stand out against the backdrop of the
general volatility and pronounced seasonality of the series. The only possible
exceptions are Germany and Spain. In December 2001, the German monthly
inﬂation rate hit 15% on an annualized basis. This is the highest level in the
sample. In Spain, inﬂation climbed to 11% and 18% in March and April of
2002.
On the whole, our reading of this evidence does not support the idea that
the changeover to the Euro had an unusual impact on European consumer
price inﬂation. Furthermore, the inﬂa t i o ne x p e r i e n c ei nt h e1 2c o u n t r i e s
converting to the Euro in January 2002 was not very diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a ti n
Denmark, Sweden, and Britain, which opted out of the Monetary Union.
Several studies, like Deutsche Bundesbank (2004), have come to the same
conclusion. In fact, the European Commissions’ oﬃcial answer to the ques-
tion ‘Has the introduction of euro notes and coins caused prices to rise?’
reads
‘Analyses by Eurostat, the European Commissions statisti-
cal service, indicate that the Euro changeover led to some price
increases in speciﬁc sectors, such as restaurants, cafes and hair-
dressers, but that the overall eﬀect on prices in the Euro area
was limited. For the all items Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices, the price increase most likely falls within the range 0.12%
to 0.29%.’6
However, this answer suggests that there are some sectors where the in-
troduction of the Euro led to signiﬁcant price increases. One of the sectors
that is speciﬁcally mentioned is restaurants and cafés, to which we turn our
attention next.
2.2 Restaurant and café prices
Price increases in January 2002 and, in some countries, the subsequent few
months were exceptionally high in the restaurant and café sector all across
6See http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_ﬁnance/euro/faqs/faqs_16_en.htm
7the Euro area. These price increases did not go unnoticed. In fact, in some
countries, questions were raised about the reason for these price increases.
In the Netherlands, for example, this led to an oﬃcial memo to Parliament,
see Centraal Plan Bureau (2002). So, what was so peculiar about restaurant
and café prices in the EU12 in January 2002?
This question is easily answered by Figure 2, which depicts the level and
inﬂation rate of the HICP for restaurants and cafés in the EU12. The average
annualized monthly inﬂation rate in the EU12 restaurant and café sector over
the period January 1995 through March 2004 was 2.81%. In January 2002,
the month in which the Euro was introduced, inﬂation was 15.63%. This
s h o w su pi nt h et o pp a n e lo fF i g u r e2a saj u m pi nt h ep r i c el e v e la n da s
a blip in the inﬂa t i o nr a t ei nt h eb o t t o mp a n e l . E v e ni nt h et h r e em o n t h s
following January 2002, restaurant and café prices in the EU12 rose at an
annualized rate that exceeds 5%. By eyeballing Figure 2, it is clear that the
January 2002 jump in restaurant and café prices in the Euro area was several
orders of magnitude bigger than anything seen before.
The EU12 pattern of restaurant and café prices was not caused by the
behavior of any particular member country. Instead, this blip in restaurant
and café prices was observed all across the Euro area. In many countries
the price increases were concentrated in January 2002. This was particularly
the case for Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands. These countries
saw an annualized inﬂation rate for restaurants and cafés in January 2002
between 20% and 50%. In other countries, like Italy and Spain, the price
increases were more moderate in January 2002 and seem to have persisted
during the subsequent months.
To further corroborate the hypothesis that these price jumps were due to
the changeover to the new currency, we compare the behavior of restaurant
and café prices in the three biggest economies that switched to the Euro, i.e.
Germany, France, and Italy, with that of the three EU countries that did not
switch to the Euro. These countries are Britain, Denmark and Sweden. The
fact that there is a set of countries that did not switch to the Euro allows
us to treat this as a sort of “natural experiment” on the eﬀect of a change
in currency on inﬂation. Figure 3 compares the “treatment” group that
switched to the Euro and the ‘control’ countries that didn’t. The restaurant
inﬂation time series for the countries that adopted the Euro are in the panels
o nt h el e f tw h i l et h ep a n e l so nt h er i g h td e p i c tt h et i m es e r i e sf o rn o n -
adopting countries. To a more (Germany), or lesser (Italy) extent, all the
“treatment” countries exhibit a blip in restaurant price inﬂation of the same
8form as the EU12 overall. In contrast, the “control” countries do not exhibit
such a blip at all.
Table 1 summarizes this striking anomaly for all countries. The table
contains the annualized rate of restaurant price inﬂation in January 2002,
denoted by πJan2002,t h ea v e r a g ei n ﬂation rate over the period 1995-2003, and
its standard deviation over the same period. Comparing the January 2002
inﬂation rate with its historical average, we ﬁnd that, except for Greece, the
January 2002 inﬂation rate exceeds the historical average by 3% or more for
all EU12 countries. In the three non-adopting countries, this diﬀerence is
0.08% or smaller.
The column of the table headed
πJan2002−π
s scales the diﬀerence between
the January 2002 inﬂation level and the historical average by the historical
standard deviation. For all EU12 countries, except Greece, the January 2002
restaurant price inﬂation level is 1.74 or more standard deviations higher
than its historical average.
Since we use non-seasonally adjusted data, part of the deviation of the
January 2002 number from the historical average might simply be due to
restaurant inﬂation generally being higher in January than in other months.
To control for this, we present the measure
πJan−¯ π
s i nt h el a s tc o l u m no f
Table 1. This reﬂects the deviation of the average level of inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
month of January from the historical average inﬂation rate, again in units of
standard deviations. Even though average inﬂa t i o ni nJ a n u a r yc o m e sf r o m
the right tail of the distribution in all Countries but Belgium, only in Spain
its magnitude is more than two standard deviations. This conﬁr m st h a tt h e
January 2002 observation is clearly anomalous, even after taking January’s
seasonal characteristics into consideration.
So, now that we have established that inﬂation in the EU12 restaurant
sector behaved anomalously after the introduction of the Euro, we are left
with the challenge to come up with a theory to explain this anomaly. It
turns out that the introduction of the Euro generates a blip in inﬂation, as
observed in the data, in commonly used models with sticky prices due to
menu costs.
93 The introduction of the Euro in sticky price
models
In this section, we show that in standard models of sticky prices a pre-
announced change in currency denomination produces a sizable blip in inﬂa-
tion, if we assume that ﬁrms take this chance to optimally reset their prices.
The models we consider are: (i) a standard Calvo (1983) model, (ii)ah y b r i d
of the Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980) models, similar to the one implemented
by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2003), and (iii) a version of the state-dependent
model of Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), DKW in the following. Finally,
(iv) we also introduce an augmented version of DKW which includes an en-
dogenous state-dependent decision by the ﬁrm on when to adopt the new
currency. Throughout the rest of the paper, as well as in Appendix A, we
will adhere as much as possible to the notational conventions in DKW.
The analysis focuses on the following scenario. Suppose the economy is
going along nicely on its steady state balanced growth path with a positive
rate of inﬂation. At time 0, the government announces that at time T>0 the
denomination of the currency will change. Among other things, this change
requires ﬁrms to change their posted prices from the old currency to the new
one and, we assume, to choose new optimal prices. In principle, one could
analyze this scenario in a general equilibrium setup. Since our focus here is
solely on the restaurant sector, we will assume that this sector is relatively
small in the overall economy. For our theoretical application, this implies
that we will assume that what happens in this sector has no eﬀect on the
path of macroeconomic aggregates.
Even though we consider a set of models that have been frequently an-
alyzed in the literature, with the possible exception of the model with en-
dogenous currency adoption, their application here is non standard. The in-
troduction of the Euro, and the forced price reoptimization that this brings
about, represent an extremely unusual shock hitting the economy. In particu-
lar, this shock causes the distribution of ﬁrms over the existing price vintages
to collapse into a spike at the new optimal price. This collapse is then fol-
lowed by a readjustment of the distribution back to its ergodic state. In what
follows, we characterize the “impulse response” of the inﬂation rate to this
shock, applying an extended path algorithm that allows us to solve exactly
for the equilibrium price index of the restaurant sector, taking as given the
10evolution of the rest of the economy.7 This theoretical exercise reproduces
quite faithfully the main features of the “natural” experiment captured in the
data. As such, it brings to the forefront some unique non-linear implications
of the models, which are often hidden from view in the small shock analysis
customary in the literature.
3.1 The model
The path of macroeconomic aggregates external to the “small” restaurant
sector is deﬁned as follows. Let aggregate output for the economy be denoted
by Yt, the aggregate price level by Pt, the nominal interest rate by rt,a n d
nominal wages by Wt. We assume that all along the endogenous equilibrium
price path for the small sector that we consider, the aggregate economy moves
exogenously along its steady state path. In particular,
Yt =( 1+g)
t y, Pt =( 1+π)
t p, rt = r>π+ g + πg,a n dWt =[ ( 1+g)(1+π)]
t w (1)
where g denotes the constant growth rate of output along the balanced growth
path, π>0 is the steady state inﬂation rate, and r is the steady state nominal
interest rate8.
Within this economy, there is a relatively small sector, which we will de-
note by the index i. This sector is the theoretical equivalent of the restaurant







Yt,w h e r eη>1 (2)
The parameter η is the elasticity of substitution between the output of sector
i and that of the other monopolistically competitive sectors in the economy.
Pit is an appropriately deﬁned price index for sector i, which we will discuss
in more detail below.
T h es e c t o ri sp o p u l a t e db yac o n t i n u u mo fﬁrms, indexed by k ∈ [0,1],
each of which supplies a slightly diﬀerentiated good. Each of the ﬁrms in the
7See the Appendix for more details on the solution method.
8The assumed lower bound on the nominal interest rate is to ensure that the ﬁrm’s
value function along the economy’s balanced growth path is bounded. See the Appendix
for more detail.














Yt,w h e r eε>1 (3)
The CES preferences that underlie these demand functions pin down the












This price index will be essential in our subsequent analysis. This is because
it is exactly a blip in the growth rate of Pit around period T that we would
like to explain.
In what follows, we will consider four diﬀerent sticky price models and
study their performance in explaining the observed blip in restaurant and
café price inﬂation in the Euro area in (and around) January 2002. To deal
with each of these four models in a coherent manner, we introduce a general
framework that nests all four of them.
In this framework, prices are sticky because ﬁr m si ne a c hs e c t o ri face a
(stochastic) ﬁxed cost of adjusting their prices. The magnitude of this cost
is drawn independently for each ﬁr mi ne a c hp e r i o d .W ed e n o t ei t sv a l u ei n
terms of units of labor by ξkt,w h e r ek indexes the ﬁrm and t time. Such a
ﬁxed cost is generally referred to as a ‘menu cost’. There are many diﬀerent
factors that are claimed to make up menu costs. However, for the restaurant
sector it seems appropriate to take the term ‘menu costs’ literally, to mean
the costs associated with printing new menus whenever prices need to be
changed. With this interpretation of menu costs, the assumption that the
adoption of a new currency must be accompanied by a reformulation of the
menus is very natural. However, even if we thought that menu costs are
primarily those associated with the need to gather the necessary information
to choose prices optimally, it would still be reasonable to assume that ﬁrms
would decide to incur those costs and reoptimize their prices when they adopt
a new currency. We make this assumption here.
All ﬁrms in sector i use a constant returns to scale technology to produce
their output and face the same nominal marginal, and thus average, cost
of production9. We denote their nominal marginal cost by Ψt. We assume
9Golosov and Lucas (2003) drop the assumption of identical marginal costs. Our main
12that its path is determined by markets for factor inputs of which the factor
demands of sector i make up a negligible fraction. That is, we assume that
Ψt is on a balanced growth path, just like the rest of the aggregate economy.
In particular, we specify
Ψt =( 1+π)
t ψ (5)
G i v e nt h i sp a t ho fm a r g i n a lc o s t s ,t h eﬂow proﬁts of ﬁrm k in sector i at
time t, charging price Pikt,e q u a l
(Pikt − Ψt)Yikt − Wtft (6)
where ft denotes the ﬂow cost of “currency mismatch”, here denoted in units
of the labor input. In particular, ﬁrms charging their price in Euros before
the oﬃcial introduction of notes and coins are assumed to incur a ﬂow cost
of fE
t hours per period, while ﬁrms sticking to the old currency after time T
would see their revenues reduced by an amount WtfD
t every period.10 The
introduction of these ﬂow costs, and of a one time “switching” cost incurred
by ﬁrms that decide to start charging in Euros, denoted by c, generates a
non trivial margin for the adoption of the new currency. This is because the
switch requires printing new menus at a cost of ξt work hours. Since this cost
is stochastic, ﬁrms have an incentive to postpone this decision, in the hope of
drawing a low menu cost. The adoption decision then becomes very similar
to the standard decision to change prices, except that the cost of delaying is
not measured in terms of lost proﬁts, but rather in terms of the exogenous
revenue loss ft.
Let V D
0,t denote the value of a ﬁrm, gross of the adjustment cost, if it
a d j u s t si t sp r i c ea tt i m et and decides to denominate its new price in the
‘old’ domestic currency. Similarly, let V E
0,t be the value of a ﬁrm that adjusts
its price at time t and decides to charge its new price in Euros. Let V D
j,t be
the value at time t of a ﬁrm that set its domestic currency denominated price
j periods ago and let V E
j,t be the value of a ﬁrm that set its Euro denominated
results are robust to this change in assumption, as long as the unanticipated variations
in marginal costs (across ﬁrms and, most importantly, across time) are relatively small
compared to the menu costs in our model.
10Even though Euro notes and coins were introduced on January 2002, domestic cur-
rencies were not withdrawn from circulation until a few months later. Charging prices in
the old currency was therefore still a possibility for businesses, albeit a progressively more
expensive one as the domestic currency became more and more scarce. Similarly, charging
prices in Euros was theoretically possible before January 2002. In fact, all ﬁnancial market
transactions and non cash payments had to be settled in Euros since January 1999.
13price j periods ago. Let ΠD
j,t denote the ﬂow proﬁts earned at time t by a
ﬁrm that adjusted its domestic currency denominated price j periods ago.
ΠE
j,t is similarly deﬁned for ﬁrms with a Euro-denominated price.
The value function of a ﬁrm adjusting its price at time t in terms of the
original currency can be written as follows
V D
















That is, a ﬁr mt h a ta d j u s t si t sp r i c ea tt i m et and sets this adjusted price
in terms of the domestic currency will choose its new price level, P∗
D,t,t o
maximize the sum of its current ﬂow proﬁts and the expected discounted
continuation value.
This continuation value is the expected maximum net value of three op-
tions faced by the ﬁrm in the next period. The ﬁrst option is to adjust its
price in the next period and pay the menu cost ξ. The second is to adjust
its price as well as change to the Euro in the next period and pay both the
menu cost ξ as well as the Euro adjustment cost c. The third option is to
continue during the next period at the price already set.
Both the menu cost, ξ, and the Euro adoption cost, c, are expressed in
units of labor. Our speciﬁcation of the adjustment costs implies that when
a ﬁrm decides to adopt the Euro it has to pay both the Euro adoption
cost, c,a sw e l la st h em e n uc o s t ,ξ. The decision to adopt the Euro clearly
requires to print new menus, generating the usual cost ξ. Moreover, the extra
complication of switching to a new currency is likely to make this process
more burdensome than usual. This extra burden on price setters is captured
by the one time cost c.
In this setting, the only source of heterogeneity across ﬁr m si st h er e a l i z e d
level of the adjustment cost they face, ξk,t. This is what determines whether
ﬁrms adjust their prices ex-post . However, since the adjustment costs are
independent over time and across ﬁrms, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc realization ξk,t does
not aﬀect the ﬁrm’s value ex-ante. This implies that all ﬁrms that change
their price and continue to denominate it in the domestic currency will change
it to the same level, P∗
D,t. For this reason, we have dropped the ﬁrm index k
in the equation above.
A ﬁrm that changes its Euro denominated price at time t has the value
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14It again chooses its new price, in this case P∗
E,t, to maximize the sum of its
ﬂow proﬁts plus the discounted value of its expected continuation options.
S i n c ew ea s s u m et h a tt h es w i t c ht ot h eE u r oi si r r e v e r s i b l e ,t h i sﬁrm faces
one less option in the next period than the ﬁrm that is still charging its prices
in the domestic currency. Its continuation value is the expected maximum of
t h en e tv a l u eo fo n l yt w oo p t i o n s .T h eﬁr s ti st oc h a n g et h ep r i c ei np e r i o d
t +1 , incurring the menu cost ξ. The second is to stay put and continue at
the set price.
Finally, a ﬁrm that does not adjust its price and still charges in terms of




























Again, because of the irreversibility of the switch to the Euro, the option of
charging in the old domestic currency does not appear in the continuation
value.
The adjustment cost ξ is drawn independently over time and across ﬁrms
from a distribution with cdf G(ξ). We will consider two parametrizations of
this distribution. The ﬁrst generates the price setting model introduced by
Calvo (1983) as well as the hybrid of Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980) studied






α for 0 ≤ ξ<ξt
1 for ξt ≤ ξ
(11)
If ξt →∞ , ﬁrms only adjust their prices when they face no adjustment cost.
This happens with probability α, irrespective of what price they are currently
charging. Because the probability of adjusting is independent of the price
currently charged, this is known as a time-dependent price adjustment rule.
If ξt < ∞, ﬁrms adjust their price when they face no adjustment cost or
whenever the beneﬁt of adjusting their price outweighs the adjustment cost
ξt. This depends on the price that the ﬁrm is currently charging, and on
15other macroeconomic conditions. Because of this dependence, this is known
as a state-dependent price adjustment rule.
The second distribution that we consider is the one proposed by DKW.










γ1t + γ2t tan(γ3tξ + γ4t) for 0 ≤ ξ<ξt
1 for ξt ≤ e ξ
(12)
However, for reasons explained in Appendix A, we reparametrize G2,t in terms
of ξt, φ,a n dφ as
































where 0 < φ<φ< 1. Appendix A also shows how G1,t (.) can be interpreted
as a limiting case of G2,t (.)11.
In summary, the dimensions along which our four models diﬀer are (i)
the distribution of menu costs, including its evolution over time, and (ii)t h e
existence of adjustment costs due to changing the denomination of prices, c,
and of ﬁxed costs due to charging prices in a particular denomination, ft.
Table 2 lists the assumptions that underlie the four models.
The ﬁrst three models are sticky price models that have previously been
considered in the literature. The ﬁrst has a menu cost distribution that
generates a price setting schedule as in Calvo (1983). In the second model,
the menu costs generate a hybrid Calvo-Taylor price setting schedule12.I n
the third, the menu cost distribution is that used by DKW. This paper’s
11Klenow and Kryvtsov (2003) show that, in the neighborhood of the steady state, the
DKW model with a calibration of G2,t(.) close to the limiting case behaves essentially like
the Calvo (1983) model. This calibration results from the observation that, in the U.S.,
the frequency of price adjustment for particular goods is almost constant over time and
across ﬁrms and does not seem to depend on the level of inﬂation ﬁrms face.
12We deﬁne the Calvo-Taylor hybrid model in terms of a state-dependent, rather than a
time-dependent, price setting rule. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2003) show that this distinction
does not matter much around the steady state. As we show later, this distinction does
matter in our oﬀ steady state analysis.
16innovation consists in studying their behavior in response to an unusual ex-
periment, namely an announced “disappearance” of menu costs at time T.
This leads all ﬁrms to choose new optimal prices, which is our way of model-
ing the eﬀect of the introduction of a new currency. Alternatively, this could
be interpreted as the ﬁrms incurring an unavoidable ﬁxed cost for switching
to the Euro, which for once also allows them to change their prices for free.
In essence, we are exogenously imposing that all ﬁrms adjust to the Euro at
time T.13
The fourth model, which is also an original contribution of our paper, is
diﬀerent from the ﬁrst three because it endogenizes the timing of the adjust-
ment to the Euro. In this model, the menu cost distribution is constant over
time and it is the structure of the ﬂow cost associated with charging prices
in diﬀerent denominations, ft, and of the switching cost, c, that determine
endogenously whether ﬁrms adopt the Euro, and when.
4 Equilibrium inﬂation dynamics
So, what happens to the path of inﬂation in the restaurant sector in response
to the announcement of the introduction of the Euro? In this section we ex-
plain the three basic mechanisms that determine the transitional equilibrium
path of inﬂation, which we refer to as (i) distributional churning, (ii)t h e
horizon eﬀect, and (iii) strategic complementarity. Here, we limit ourselves
to the intuitive illustration of these concepts and of the way in which they
inﬂuence the evolution of prices in equilibrium. Most of the analytical details
are left for Appendix A.
The equilibrium dynamics for sector i after the announcement of the
introduction of the Euro are determined by three important factors: (i)h o w
many ﬁrms in each period update their prices, (ii)w h a tf r a c t i o no fﬁrms
c h o o s e st oc h a n g ed e n o m i n a t i o n ,a n d( iii)a tw h a tr a t et h e s eﬁrms raise
their prices.
T h ep a t ho fp r i c e sr e ﬂects the evolution of two classes of equilibrium
objects. First, we have the optimal prices set by reoptimizing ﬁrms. We
already showed that there are only two of these prices, P∗
D,t and P∗
E,t respec-
tively. They are the same for all ﬁrms that update their price at time t and
13We chose to make all ﬁrms adopt the Euro at time T by assuming that ξT =0 .T h i s




17choose the same denomination, either D, for the domestic currency, or E,
for the Euro. The second equilibrium variable is the distribution of ﬁrms
over the relevant state space. At each point in time, the two factors that
distinguish ﬁrms and are relevant for their price setting behavior are (i)h o w
long ago they changed their price, indexed by j,a n d( ii)i nw h a td e n o m i -
nation they are charging their price, denoted by S ∈ {D,E}.A si nD K W ,
we denote the fraction of ﬁrms in period t that changed their price j periods
ago and that charge their price in denomination S as ωS
j,t.
How many ﬁrms in each period update their price and change denomi-
nation determines the behavior of this distribution over time. In order to
capture its dynamics, we consider the joint price adjustment and denomina-
tion choice probabilities. They are given by αS0
j,t for S0 ∈ {C,D,E},w h e r e
C stands for change. Here, αS0
j,t for S0 ∈ {D,E} denotes the fraction of ﬁrms
charging a price set j periods ago in denomination S0, which change their
price at time t but still charge in the same denomination. Then αC
j,t de-
notes the fraction of ﬁrms charging a price set j periods ago in the domestic
currency, which change their price at time t and switch to the Euro.
Given these deﬁnitions, we can write the dynamics of ωS





















































In equilibrium, the set of diﬀerent prices charged is countable. This im-
plies that the integral in equation (4), which determines the price level, Pit,





















which shows how the overall price level depends on the distribution of prices
charged across ﬁrms.
18This equation highlights the two basic factors that determine the path





j and (ii)t h e






In Appendix A, we solve for the prices that the ﬁrms choose when they
adjust them. Just like in Calvo (1983) and DKW (1999), the optimal price
setting policy for ﬁrms in this economy is to set their prices equal to a markup
times a weighted average of current and future levels of their marginal costs.


















j,t (1 + π)
j for S ∈ {D,E} (22)
where ε/(ε − 1) > 1 is the markup term and the weights ΩS
j,t sum to one
across j’s. As shown in the appendix, the weights ΩS
j,t depend on three things.
The ﬁrst is the discount factor λ =( 1 + g)(1+π)/(1 + r) < 1.T h e
lower the discount factor, the less the ﬁrm cares about future proﬁts relative
to current proﬁts. This reduces the degree to which the ﬁrm takes into




j,t depends on the probability of not having adjusted the price
j periods after time t. The intuition is fairly straightforward. Under ﬂexible
prices, the ﬁrm always chooses its price to equal the markup times the current
level of marginal cost. However, when it is not sure when it will adjust its
prices again, the ﬁrm not only takes into account current marginal costs, but
a l s ot h em a r g i n a lc o s tl e v e l st h a ti ti sl i k e l yt of a c eb e f o r ea d j u s t i n gi t sp r i c e
again. The more likely it is to face a particular marginal cost level, the more
weight this gets in the price setting policy. When a ﬁrm adjusts its price at
time t, the likelihood of facing a marginal cost level of Ψt+j before adjusting
its price again is determined by the probability of not having adjusted the
price j periods after time t.
The ﬁnal factor aﬀecting the weights ΩS
j,t is the eﬀect of the sector’s price
level on the demand for a ﬁrm’s good. As long as a ﬁrm does not adjust its
price, its price will drop relative to the sector’s price level Pit.T h ee ﬀect of








Hence, whenever the within sector price elasticity of demand, ε,i sb i g g e r
than the price elasticity of demand for the sector as a whole, η,a ni n c r e a s e
19in the sectorial price level Pit will increase the marginal revenue of ﬁrm k.I n
that case, if all other ﬁrms charge a higher price, contributing to an increase
in Pit, ﬁrm k will want to charge a higher price as well. Because an individual
ﬁrm’s best price setting response is increasing in the prices set by the other
ﬁrms, this is a strategic complementarity in the sense of Cooper and John
(1988).
Three basic mechanisms aﬀect the path of Pit in sector i after the an-
nouncement of the introduction of the Euro. They are (i) distributional
churning, (ii) the horizon eﬀect, and (iii) strategic complementarity. In our
version of the model, the ﬁrst two account for the bulk of the quantitative
eﬀect of the Euro on inﬂation in the restaurant sector. In the rest of this
section, we will discuss each of these eﬀects in turn and how they relate to
the equilibrium variables described above.
Distributional churning On the balanced growth path that the sector
is on before the announcement of the introduction of the Euro, a constant
fraction of ﬁrms update their price in each period. Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2003) ﬁnd that this is approximately the case for most sectors in the U.S..
The Euro, however, causes an anticipated deviation from this pattern. It
induces all the ﬁrms to change their prices within a short time period around
the time the Euro is introduced. Hence, when the Euro is introduced, the
distribution of prices, ωjt, shifts towards prices that have been set relatively
recently. That is, most of the mass of this distribution will be at j =0 .I n
fact, in models (i) through (iii) ,i nw h i c hw ea s s u m et h a ta l lﬁrms update
their price at time T, all the mass will be at j =0at time T by assumption.
This churning of the distribution of prices charged has two eﬀects on the level
of inﬂation. First of all, it leads to higher inﬂation at, or around, time T.
This is because in that period a disproportionate number of ﬁrms are raising
their prices. The second eﬀect is that, after the adoption of the Euro, the
distribution of prices has a relatively small variance, so that ﬁrms adjusting
their price in the subsequent periods will not raise it as much as they did
in the steady state. This leads to a reduction in inﬂation after time T.
This is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 5, which depicts the price
adjustments in the steady state relative to those s∗ periods after T.A tt i m e
T + s∗, the distribution of ﬁrms over how long ago they last adjusted prices
is truncated at s∗, resulting in smaller average price increases for ﬁrms that
change their prices.
20Horizon eﬀect As we noted above, the weights with which future increases
in marginal costs are reﬂected in prices set in period t, ΩS
j,t, are decreasing in
the probability of the ﬁrm adjusting its price before t + j. The introduction
of the Euro implies that ﬁrms charging their price in the domestic currency
will certainly change their price on, or around, time T.
Consequently, prices set before ﬁrms adjust to the Euro do not take into
account marginal cost increases expected to occur after the adoption of the
new currency. This leads to a decline in inﬂation before time T, for two
reasons. First, because the ﬁrms that do adjust, need to increase prices by
a lower amount, since they know they will soon be adjusting again. Second,
because some ﬁrms, knowing that they must adjust at date T, will choose to
postpone their reoptimization. Of course, this second channel is operational
only in the state dependent models, in which the timing of reoptimization is a
choice variable for the ﬁrm. Once a ﬁrm adopts the Euro, its price adjustment
horizon expands and its new price reﬂects the increases in marginal costs over
a much longer horizon than before.
This eﬀect is illustrated in the top panel of Figure 5. The thick line in
the top half of the ﬁgure reﬂects the path of future increases in marginal
costs. The bottom of the ﬁgure contains two weighting schemes. The ﬁrst
reﬂects the steady state weights of future marginal cost increases that ﬁrms
apply when the economy is on its balanced growth path. The second is the
truncated sequence of weights that ﬁrms use when they set their prices s∗
periods before the introduction of the Euro in models (i)t h r o u g h( iii). In
model (iv) these weights are not necessarily truncated but will decline rapidly
around s∗, depending on the speed of adoption of the Euro.
The result of this horizon eﬀect is that the prices set by Euro adopters
reﬂect future marginal cost increases that were not incorporated in the prices
they previously charged in the domestic currency. This implies that these
ﬁrms will increase their prices at a much higher rate than their counterparts
that stick to charging their prices in the old currency. Note that this eﬀect
only occurs whenever marginal costs are expected to increase in the future.
That is, the assumption that steady state inﬂation is positive, i.e. π>0,i s
crucial to our argument.
Strategic complementarity When ε>η , strategic complementarity mag-
niﬁes the two eﬀects described above. The fact that other ﬁrms increase their
prices when the Euro is introduced increases each individual ﬁrm’s incentive
21to raise its price even more. Our numerical results, presented in the next
section, suggest however that this mechanism is quantitatively not very im-
portant.
Hence, the two most important mechanisms governing the equilibrium
behavior of prices in sector i are the distributional churning and the horizon
eﬀect. The former increases the fraction of ﬁrms that adjust their prices at
time T.The latter increases the level of the prices set at the time of adoption.
As shown in the next section, both are important contributors to the blip in
inﬂation.
5 H o wd o e st h em o d e lc o m p a r et ot h ed a t a ?
In this section, we compare the implications of the introduction of the Euro
in our four models with the facts observed for restaurant price inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
E u r oa r e a .T h i si sd o n eb yc h o o s i n gv a l u e sf o rt h em o d e l ’ sp a r a m e t e r sb a s e d
on historical and cross-sectional evidence. Given these parameter values, we
then consider whether our models imply a path of inﬂation in a four year
window around time T that is similar to that observed in the data around
January 2002.
This section has four parts. In the ﬁrst, we describe the choice of the
parameters common to the four models. In the second part, we present
the inﬂation path implied by the Calvo model, i.e. model (i). We use this
model to illustrate the working of the ‘horizon eﬀect’ and of ‘distributional
churning’. We also show that commonly assumed degrees of price stickiness
generate an inﬂation blip in this model that by far exceeds the one observed
i nt h ed a t a . I nt h et h i r dp a r t ,w es h o wh o wt h ec h a n g e si nt h em e n uc o s t
distribution that produce the Calvo-Taylor hybrid and DKW models are
associated with a reduction in the size of the inﬂation ﬂare. This reduction
however is still short of what is needed to match our empirical observation.
Finally, in the fourth part, we show how dropping the assumption that all
ﬁrms adopt the Euro exactly at time T, and allowing them instead to choose
when to adopt, reduces the size of the blip to a level very close to that
observed in the Euro area. That is, the state-dependent choice of both the
price setting and the Euro adoption are crucial to ﬁtting the observed facts.
225.1 Choice of model parameters
The parameters common to all four models are those related to (i)t h el o n g -
run balanced growth path and to (ii) the shape of the demand curves.
We set the parameters related to the long-run balanced growth path of
the economy based on evidence for the Euro area for the period 1995-2003,
obtained from Eurostat. We choose r =5 .9% (annual rate), which equals the
average long term interest rate paid in the secondary market for government
b o n d sw i t ha na v e r a g ey i e l do f1 2m o n t h s . F o ri n ﬂation, we use π =2 .8%
(annual rate), which is the average Euro area HICP restaurant and café price
inﬂation over the sample period. Finally, for the growth rate of the economy,
we take g =2 .0%. This corresponds to the average growth rate of real GDP
for the Euro area over the 1995-2003 period.
We normalize the parameters y = w = ψ =1 . They do not matter for
the equilibrium price path in our model. This normalization does, however,
aﬀect our interpretation of the cost parameters c, ft,a n dξ. For this reason,
we present our results in the rest of the paper in terms of the menu costs and
adjustment costs to the Euro as a percentage of total revenue under ﬂexible
prices.
Calibration of the demand parameters ε and η is a bit less straightforward.
Fortunately, our results are not very sensitive to changes in their magnitudes.
We choose ε =1 1as a benchmark for the within sector price elasticity, which
corresponds to a 10% net markup in the ﬂexible price equilibrium. This is
a common choice in the empirical literature on the New-Keynesian Phillips
C u r v e( s e ef o re x a m p l eG a l í ,G e r t l e r ,a n d López-Salido, 2001). Calibration of
the elasticity of the relative demand for goods of diﬀerent sectors, η, is rather
hard. However, it is reasonable to assume that goods within each category
are closer substitutes than between categories. This would imply ε ≥ η.
Quite arbitrarily, we will focus here on the corner case η = ε.T h i s i s a l s o
the case in which there is no strategic complementarity. Our results however
are relatively insensitive to a choice of ε>η . In other words, strategic
complementarities are quantitatively unimportant for our application.
5.2 The Calvo-model benchmark
Both as a benchmark as well as a tool to illustrate the basic mechanisms
driving equilibrium inﬂa t i o ni nt h i sm o d e l ,i ti sw o r t h w h i l et os t a r tb yc o n -
sidering the equilibrium path of inﬂa t i o ni nt h eC a l v om o d e l .T od os o ,w e
23need to choose a value of the price adjustment probability, i.e. α.
Our benchmark case is the one in which 75% of the restaurants adjust
their price at least once a year. This calibration implies that, in each quarter,
approximately 70% of the restaurants do not change their price, which is in
line with the aggregate Phillips Curve estimates for the Euro area presented
in Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001). It also implies that in each month
α =1 1 %of the restaurants adjust their prices. This closely matches the
observation by Bils and Klenow (2002) that, in an average month in the
U.S., 9% of the prices of dinners and lunches consumed away from home
change. This matched fact is included as fact 1 in Table 3, which contains
all the facts that we use to calibrate our “stickiness” parameters.
Figure 6 depicts the actual annualized Euro area restaurant price inﬂation
as well as the path implied by the Calvo model for the four years from January
2000 through December 2003. The equilibrium path of inﬂa t i o ni nt h eC a l v o
model shows a slight decline before January 2002. This is the result of
the horizon eﬀect. That is, ﬁrms that change their price shortly before the
introduction of the Euro only incorporate the increases in marginal cost into
their price that occur before the Euro is introduced. This shortens the horizon
of marginal cost increases included in the prices and consequently reduces the
price increases and the inﬂation rate. After January 2002, the model predicts
an even bigger decline which is completely due to distributional churning. In
fact, the predicted annualized restaurant price inﬂation rate in February 2002
is below 0.5%, while the actual rate was 5.2%.
The predicted reduction in inﬂation after January 2002 is not the biggest
shortcoming of the Calvo model, however. The calibrated degree of price
rigidity generates a blip in inﬂation in January 2002 much higher than ob-
s e r v e di nt h ed a t a .T h em o d e lp r o d u c e sar a t eo fi n ﬂation in January 2002 of
61.3%, as compared with the 15.6% observed in the data. The degree of price
r i g i d i t yi nt h em o d e lt h a tw o u l dr e s u l ti na ni n ﬂation blip of 15.6% is one
in which 98.5% of the restaurants adjust their prices at least once in a year.
This is equivalent to a quarter of the restaurants changing their prices each
month, which would imply that prices are much less sticky than suggested
by the available evidence.
Why does the Calvo model generate an inﬂation blip much higher than
the one observed in the data? The main reason is the assumption that a
positive fraction of ﬁrms have not adjusted their prices for an arbitrarily
long period. That is, ωj,t > 0 for all t and j>0 and thus also for j
arbitrarily large. In terms of restaurants, this implies that when the Euro
24is introduced in January 2002, there are pizzas still being sold at prices set
in 1902! Those pizzerias that have not been able to set their price for a
century end up changing their prices at time T, along with everybody else,
and increase them by a very high percentage. The smaller α, the higher the
fraction of this type of restaurants and the higher the inﬂation spike.
In traditional analysis of the Calvo model, and of most sticky price mod-
els, this assumption is not very important. This is because they are based on a
log-linear approximation around a non inﬂationary steady state, in which the
distribution of ﬁrms over price vintages never changes. In this experiment,
on the contrary, the introduction of the Euro is modeled as an exogenous
variation in the timing of price setting, which results in a reshuﬄing of the
distribution of ﬁrms. In normal circumstances (i.e. in the ergodic state), only
af r a c t i o nα of the pizzerias with 1902 prices would reset their price every
period. Moreover, with zero average inﬂation, their very old price would be
still fairly close to their current desired price. In our world instead, all the
pizzerias, including those with very old prices, are given the chance to reset
them at time T. This, together with the fact that a positive average inﬂation
makes their 1902 price a very small fraction of their current desired price,
is behind the blip in inﬂation produced by the model. The peculiarity of
our experiment, which involves a “big” deviation from steady state, and non
trivial transitional dynamics in the distribution of ﬁrms, also explains why
we could not rely on the usual log-linearization approach, and opted instead
to solve for the exact dynamics of inﬂation.14
5.3 Calvo-Taylor hybrid and DKW model
The Calvo-Taylor hybrid model, our model (ii), assumes that, in any period,
the maximum amount of time a ﬁr mh a sh a di t sp r i c e sﬁxed is ﬁnite. That
is, at any point in time the distribution ωj,t is truncated in the sense that
there exists a Jt such that ωj,t =0for all j>J t.S u c hat r u n c a t i o ni m p l i e s
that in this model there will not be any pizzerias ﬁnally resetting their prices
after a century. Because of this, the Calvo-Taylor hybrid model will tend to
generate a smaller blip in inﬂa t i o nt h a nt h eC a l v om o d e l .
Implementing the hybrid model requires the choice of two parameters.
The ﬁrst is the probability of facing no menu costs, α, and the second is the
size of the maximum menu cost, denoted by ξ.
14More details on the solution method can be found in the Appendix.
25For the maximum menu cost level, ξ,w ef o l l o wD K W .T h e yc h o o s eξ to
equal 3.75% of the ﬂexible price steady state labor supply. At their calibrated
labor share of 2/3, this implies that the maximum menu cost incurred is
2.5% of ﬂexible price steady state revenue. We replicate this calibration in
our model.15. This is listed as matched fact 2 in Table 3. Given ξ,t h e
adjustment probability α is again chosen to match the ﬁr s tf a c to ft h et a b l e ,
that. in steady state 11% of restaurants change their prices each month.
Figure 7 depicts the equilibrium path of inﬂa t i o ni nt h eC a l v o - T a y l o rh y -
brid model. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, the truncation of the distribution
of the ﬁrms across the state space, the time since the last price adjustment,
does reduce the implied inﬂation blip on January 2002 by about half. In-
ﬂation drops from 61.3% for the Calvo model to 32.6% for the Calvo-Taylor
hybrid. However, this 32.6% is still two times as high as the inﬂation number
actually observed.
Furthermore, the Calvo-Taylor hybrid model implies some counterfactual
inﬂation echoes in response to the introduction of the Euro. For this particu-
lar calibration, these echoes occur once every 18 months. They are evident in
Figure 7 in terms of the 13.4% annualized price increase in July 2003. That
is, the inﬂation echo implied by the model is almost as big as the actual blip
in inﬂation observed on January 2002, but no other spikes of comparable
magnitude are apparent in the data.
The problem with the hybrid model is that, in order to reduce the echoes,
one has to choose a large ξ. In the limit, when ξ →∞ , the Calvo-Taylor
hybrid model is equivalent to the Calvo model, which does not have any
echoes. However, such a reduction in echoes due to an increase in ξ would
increase the implied inﬂation blip in January 2002. On the other hand, to
match that inﬂation observation, one has to reduce ξ, which in turn increases
the echoes. Either way, the model has clearly counterfactual implications.
There are, in principle, many ways to get rid of the implied echoes in
sticky price models due to menu costs. One approach is to add more noise
by adding a dimension to the state space. This is the approach taken by
Golosov and Lucas (2003), who add to their model heterogenous levels of
marginal costs across ﬁrms. Here, we will keep the state space the same and
instead spread the probability mass of the menu cost distribution over the
15Our model is calibrated at a monthly frequency, rather than at the quarterly frequency
used by DKW. Hence, even though we use a similar calibration strategy, the maximum






by using a menu cost distribution of the form G2,t, as in DKW.
Relative to the ﬁrst two models, this distribution requires the calibration of
an additional parameter, i.e. both 0 <φ< φ<1 rather than only α.
Unfortunately, calibrating these parameters based on empirical facts is
fairly challenging. For this reason we experimented with several values of φ,
choosing φ and ¯ ξ to match facts 1 and 2 of Table 3, the same we had matched
with the hybrid model. Since we did not pin down φ using any outside facts,
we list it as a free parameter in the sixth row of Table 3. In practice, however,
the results for φ =0 .25, 0.5,a n d0.75 are virtually indistinguishable. For
this reason, we will focus on φ =0 .5.
This result is depicted as ‘DKW’ in Figure 7. As can be seen from the




does smooth out the echo eﬀects. It
does not, however, resolve the issue that models (i), (ii), and (iii) all imply
too high a blip in inﬂation in January 2002.
5.4 Endogenous adoption of the Euro
In all three model simulations above, we assumed that 100% of the ﬁrms
adopt the Euro in January 2002. Survey evidence, in Gallup Europe (2002),
however, suggests that this was not the case in practice. When asked, in
February 2002,
‘At what time did or will your company pass on totally to the
euro when it comes to ... its prices?’
49.2% of the ﬁrms surveyed answered ‘in the course of January 2002’, another
29.2% claimed they would adjust in that February, while the other 21.6% said
March 2002 or later.
This suggests that more than half of the ﬁrms delayed their switch to
the Euro to after January 2002. Thus, the assumption of all ﬁrms switching
in that January, on which the previous simulation results are based, grossly
overstates the fraction of ﬁrms adjusting their prices in the month that the
Euro was introduced. This overstatement implies an overestimation of the
blip in the models presented so far.
Hence, to compare the implications of the sticky price model with the
data, it is crucial to incorporate a state-dependent decision on the adoption
of the Euro as well. This is the extension included in the augmented version
of DKW, model (iv).
27Implementation of this model requires calibrating the three parameters
related to the adoption costs of the Euro. The ﬁrst is the per period operating
cost of adopting the Euro before January 2002, i.e. fE.W ec h o o s efE to be
s ol a r g et h a tn o n eo ft h eﬁrms will adopt the Euro before January 2002, fact
5 in Table 3. This is consistent with the simple observation that Euro coins
and bills were simply not available before that January. The second fact,
listed as fact 4 in the same table, is taken from Centraal Plan Bureau (2002).
It reports that Euro adoption costs were about 7.5% of average monthly
revenue for the Dutch restaurant and café sector16. We therefore calibrate
c so that in our model Euro adoption costs are 7.5% of steady state ﬂexible
price monthly revenue. Finally, we calibrate fD, the monthly operating cost
for charging in the domestic currency after the Euro has been introduced,
to match a 50% January 2002 adoption rate. This is in line with the 49.2%
found in the survey by Gallup Europe (2002).
For the calibration of the menu cost distribution parameters, we take the
same approach here as we did for the original DKW model. We choose them
to match fact 1 from Table 3 and consider the sensitivity of our results for
the choice of the free parameter φ. Just like in the original DKW model,
the results are very similar for φ =0 .25, 0.5,a n d0.75. Again, we will only
present the ones for φ =0 .5.
The resulting equilibrium path of restaurant price inﬂation is plotted in
Figure 8. At 13.0%, the simulated inﬂation blip is remarkably close to the
15.6% observed in the data. Besides doing a fairly good job at generating a
reasonable inﬂation blip, the delayed adoption in the model also implies that
there is above average inﬂation in the months following the introduction of
the Euro. The model generates annualized restaurant price inﬂation levels
of 7.4% and 4.1% in February and March of 2002, while the observed levels
were 5.2% and 6.2% respectively. Hence, besides generating a blip of a size
comparable to that in the data, the model also matches the persistently
high restaurant price inﬂation during the ﬁrst quarter of 2002. However, the
persistence seems to be a bit higher in the data than generated by the model.
Besides the path of inﬂation, the equilibrium of the augmented DKW
model also determines the path of the fraction of ﬁrms that have adopted
the Euro as well as the fraction of restaurants that adjust their price in each
month.
16The Dutch term for this sector is HoReCa: Hotels, Restaurants, and Cafés.
28Figure 9 depicts the implied path of the share of ﬁrms that have adopted
the Euro in the months following January 2002. It also contains the two ob-
servations on this path that are reported by Gallup Europe (2002), namely
those for January and February. We matched the January observation to
calibrate our parameters. Beyond this matched observation, the model im-
plies an adoption path close to the one in the data for the month of February.
The observed adoption share in February 2002 is 78.4. The model predicts
this to be 75.7%. The model also implies that it will take until June 2002
for 99% of the ﬁrms to adopt the Euro and only in December 2002 will full
adoption be accomplished. Although we know of no formal evidence, this is
probably a slightly slower adoption than what actually occurred.
Finally, Figure 10 shows the fraction of ﬁrms that change their prices in
each month. Bear in mind that, in the absence of the introduction of the
Euro, this fraction would be constant at 11%. Three phases in the evolution
of this fraction are evident from the ﬁgure. The ﬁr s ti st h ed e c l i n eb e f o r e
January 2002. This decline is caused by the horizon eﬀect. That is, the
anticipated price change occurring at the time of the switch makes price
changes right before less valuable, inducing ﬁrms to forego them more often
than in steady state. The second phase occurs in January 2002 and the
months right after, when the adoption of the Euro causes 99% of the ﬁrms to
adjust their prices at least once in a span of 6 months. In steady state this
number would only be 50%. The ﬁn a lp h a s ei st h ed r o pi np r i c ea d j u s t m e n t s
induced by the distributional churning. In Figure 10, this drop lasts from
April through September 2002.
In conclusion, for reasonable parameter values, the augmented DKW
model closely replicates the response of Euro area restaurant price inﬂa-
tion to the introduction of the Euro in January 2002. The state-dependent
choices of both the timing of price changes as well as the adoption of the
Euro are an integral part of the model’s ability to replicate the facts. This is
because the blip in inﬂation is due to changes in the timing of price adjust-
ments relative to steady state. Such changes cannot be captured by models
with time dependent pricing rules. Hence, we ﬁnd that for understanding the
inﬂuence of price stickiness on inﬂation in the occasion of a currency change,
this distinction is essential. This is in contrast to Klenow and Kryvtsov’s re-
sult (2003), that state dependence versus time dependence does not matter
quantitatively around the steady state.
Our sticky price model seems to ﬁt the behavior of Euro area restaurant
price inﬂation very well. This begs the question of why other sectors of
29the Euro area economy did not observe a price increase similar to that of
restaurants and cafés. This is probably in large part due to the fact that
prices in other sectors tend to be more ﬂexible than those in restaurants and
cafés. Evidence in Bils and Klenow (2002) and van Els et. al. (2002) suggests
that restaurant prices are among the most sticky prices on both sides of the
Atlantic.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The increase in restaurant prices in the Euro area right after the introduction
of the Euro in January 2002 was unprecedented according to any recent
historical standard. Countries like the Netherlands, Germany, and Finland,
all registered annualized monthly price increases in their restaurant sectors
in January 2002 higher than 20%.
In this paper we showed that, even though these price increases were un-
precedented, they should not have been unexpected. We introduced a model
with sticky prices and an endogenous decision to adopt the Euro and showed
that, for realistic parameter values, the model generates such a blip in inﬂa-
tion when the denomination of prices is changed. Because our model relies
on the concept of menu costs, it seems especially applicable to restaurants
and cafés.
Two main eﬀects are responsible for the blip in inﬂation generated by the
model.
The ﬁrst, which we call ‘distributional churning’, makes all ﬁrms raise
their prices in, or around, the period in which the Euro is introduced. Hence,
the introduction of the Euro leads to a disproportionate number of ﬁrms
raising their prices and thus to higher inﬂation.
Secondly, these ﬁrms also raise their prices at a higher rate than in the
absence of the new currency. This result, which we call the ‘horizon eﬀect’,
is due to the optimal price setting policy implied by our sticky price. Since
ﬁrms know that they will have the opportunity to adjust their prices when
they switch to the Euro, the prices that they set before that time do not
reﬂect the increases in marginal costs expected to occur after the adoption
date. As soon as they adopt, however, their new price will reﬂect these
future cost increases. This change in the horizon of future marginal cost
increases incorporated in the prices before and after the introduction of the
Euro implies that the adopters raise their prices at a higher rate than those
30which continue to charge prices in the old domestic currency.
Because our explanation is based on commonly used sticky price models,
we do not have to rely on more unconventional assumptions of collusion,
multiple equilibria, or pricing points. Instead, our explanation is simply
based on intertemporal optimization, where prices at diﬀerent points in time
reﬂect diﬀerent weighted averages of future increases in marginal costs.
The results in this paper have important policy implications. They show
that the adoption of a new currency is not necessarily neutral in a monetary
sense. In fact, in economies with relatively sticky prices and high inﬂation
rates, a change in the denomination of the currency might actually have
signiﬁcant short-run inﬂationary eﬀects. Such eﬀects can be alleviated, how-
ever, by allowing for a broader window within which ﬁrms can adopt the new
currency.
The model presented here is a partial equilibrium framework. Consider-
ing the eﬀects on the overall economy would require adding the change in
currency denomination to a general equilibrium model. We leave this task
to future research.
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33A Mathematical details
This appendix contains the mathematical details underlying the results in the main text.
The results are explained in the order that they appear in the text.
Equation (12): DKW adjustment cost distribution
The intuition behind our parameterization, using 0 < φ<φ< 1 and ξ,o ft h eD K W
menu cost distribution function is most easily explained using ﬁgure 4. The distribution











This is the interval that is depicted in the ﬁgure by the arrow denoted by (i). The mapping





of the parameters γ3t and γ4t. Arrow (ii)d e p i c t sh o wγ1t is determined. That is, γ1t is
such that the value of the distribution function at the minimum of its support equals zero.
To assure that the menu cost assumes a value within its support with probability one, γ2t
is chosen such that arrow (iii)i so fl e n g t ho n e .
Note that G1,t (.) is a limiting case of G2,t (.) in the sense that G2,t (.) → G1,t (.) when


















Section 4: Equilibrium inﬂation dynamics
For the derivation of the equilibrium inﬂation dynamics and equilibrium price adjust-
ment behavior it turns out to be convenient to write the problem in terms of variables





















for s ∈ {D,E} and j =0 ,...,∞.




















where again s ∈ {D,E} and j =0 ,...,∞.
Furthermore, we can write the functional equations for the detrended value function
as
vD

















































34where λ =( 1+g)(1+π)/(1 + r).
Since these value functions are deﬁned in terms of variables that are constant along
the economy’s balanced growth path, we will use this representation of the value func-
tions to solve for the transitional path in the price level if sector i that results from the
announcement of the conversion to the Euro.
In order to solve the equilibrium inﬂa t i o nd y n a m i c si nt h i sm o d e l ,w en e e dt od e ﬁne
the proper state space. The structure of the state space in this model is very similar to
that in DKW. The main diﬀerence is that it is not only deﬁned as the discrete distribution
of ﬁrms over the length over which they have not adjusted their prices but also over the
denomination in which they charge their prices.
Let θ
S
j,t for S ∈ {D,E} denote the fraction of ﬁrms at the start of period t that changed
their price j periods ago and that charge their price in denomination S. Furthermore, let
αS0
j,t for S0 ∈ {D,E} denote the fraction of ﬁrms that are charging a price that they set
j periods ago in denomination S0 that change their price at time t and that keep on
charging their price in the same denomination. Let αC
j,t denote the fraction of ﬁrms that
are charging a price that they set j periods ago in their old domestic currency that change
their price at time t as well as switch to the Euro. Finally, let ωS
j,t for S ∈ {D,E} denote
the fraction of ﬁrms at the end of period t that changed their price j periods ago and that
charge their price in denomination S. Here, the end of period refers to the part of the
period after which ﬁrms have made their pricing decisions. This is the part of the period
in which revenue is generated and prices are measured.













































j,t for S ∈ {D,E} (36)
where, since the state represents a distribution of ﬁrms, ωS




Furthermore, since they represent transition probabilities, 0 ≤ αS
j,t ≤ 1 for S ∈ {C,D,E}.
This deﬁnition of the state allows us to deﬁne the price level at the end of the period as
a function of the state and the prices set by the ﬁrms. That is, we can write the measured







































which is constant on the balanced growth path.
Solving for the ﬁrms’ optimal price setting decision involves solving for three decisions:
(i)w h e t h e ro rn o tt oa d j u s tt h e i rp r i c e ,( ii) whether or not to switch to the Euro (in case
they are charging prices in the domestic currency), and (iii)w h a tp r i c et oc h a r g ei ft h e
price is adjusted. We will tackle parts (i)a n d( ii) ﬁrst and then solve (iii).
A ﬁrm that charges its price in Euros in period t and set that price j periods ago will
adjust its price whenever the menu cost it draws is smaller than the gain in value that the





























This price adjustment rule is essentially the same as that in DKW.
This is not the case for the a ﬁrm that charges its price in the domestic currency,
though. Rather than deciding on whether or not to change its price, such a ﬁrm decides
on whether to change its price and continue to charge it in the domestic currency, change
its price and start charging it in Euros, or not change its price at all.
If the ﬁrm decides to change its price, it will start charging it in Euros whenever the
value of charging it in Euros net of the Euro conversion adjustment cost is higher than
the value of continuing to charge it in the domestic currency. That is, if the ﬁrm adjusts
its price, it will convert to the Euro whenever
vE
0,t − cw ≥ vD
0,t (41)
This result implies that, if this inequality holds strictly one way or the other, either all
ﬁrms that charge their prices in domestic currency and adjust their prices will change to




A ﬁrm that set its domestic currency denominated price j periods ago will adjust its












































Here, we assume that, in case of indiﬀerence, ﬁrms will switch to the Euro. Its expected




















0 ξdG(ξ) whenever vE




The solution of these adjustment probabilities and expected adjustment costs now
allows us to solve for the optimal price P∗
S,t for S ∈ {D,E}. However, we will solve for the
optimal price detrended price, p∗
S,t, rather than for P∗
S,t. In order to do so, it is convenient
to ﬁrst rewrite the functional equations that deﬁne the value function by substituting in
the optimal price adjustment decisions. This yields
vD










































































































































































































































Solving the optimality condition through forward recursion yields that p∗






























































































































38which is the result used in the main text
Section 5: Numerical solution method
For the numerical solution of our model we use the ‘extended path’ method. This
method has been applied in other studies of transitional dynamics, like Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (1997). We will assume that our economy starts oﬀ in period 0 in the steady
state in which everyone charges their prices in the domestic currency and charging prices
in Euros is not an option. In period 0 the conversion to the Euro at time T is announced.
We will solve for the transitional path of the economy under the assumption that at time
T>T>0 the sector has converged to its new steady state. This new steady state is the
one in which all ﬁrms charge their prices in Euros.
The numerical solution method basically works as follows
1. We start with a guess for the equilibrium price path {pi,t}
T
t=0.
2. We solve the optimal price setting response for the ﬁrms. This is done using the
value function iterations, (47) through (50), the optimal price setting rules, (60)
and (62), and the transition equations for the state space, (32) through (36) and
(40), (43) and (44).
3. The new path of the prices and the state space is then used to solve the price level














39Table 1: January 2002 restaurant inﬂation anomaly in the EU12




Austria 6.72 2.10 2.31 2.00 0.82
Belgium 5.54 2.28 1.87 1.74 -0.15
Finland 26.11 2.05 4.03 5.98 1.05
France 18.75 2.24 2.00 8.28 1.46
Germany 28.80 1.52 2.96 9.22 0.79
Greece 3.53 9.33 29.85 -0.19 0.03
Ireland 15.08 4.94 5.05 2.01 0.49
Italy 9.82 3.21 1.99 3.32 0.38
Luxemburg 17.31 2.47 3.03 4.89 1.09
Netherlands 50.05 3.38 6.00 7.78 1.81
Portugal 18.67 4.02 4.97 2.95 1.03
Spain 14.84 3.94 2.86 3.82 2.41
EU12 15.63 2.81 1.85 6.91 1.66
Britain 1.01 3.25 1.73 -1.29 -0.54
Denmark 1.06 2.29 3.03 -0.41 0.33
Sweden 2.18 2.10 4.04 0.02 -0.22
Table 2: Menu and ﬁxed costs in the four models
Calvo Calvo-Taylor DKW Augmented DKW
parameter period (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
distribution of ξ all G1t G1t G2t G2t
ξt t 6= T ∞ > 0 > 0 > 0
ξt t = T 000 > 0
c all 000 > 0
ft t<T 000
fE > 0 if S = E
0 otherwise
ft t ≥ T 000
fD > 0 if S = D
0 otherwise
40Table 3: Calibration of the menu and adjustment cost parameters
Calvo Calvo-Taylor DKW Augmented DKW
matched fact (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1.
11% of ﬁrms adjust
their price each month ααφ φ
2.
maximum adjustment
cost is 2.5% of revenue ξ ξ ξ
3.
50% of ﬁrms adopt the
Euro in January 2002 fD
4.
Euro adoption costs 7.5%
of monthly revenue c
5.
No ﬁrms adopt the Euro
before January 2002 fE
6. Free parameter φ φ
Note: Matched facts consistent with: 1. Galí,Gertler, López-Salido (2001) and Bils and
Klenow (2002), 2. Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999), 3. Gallup Europe (2002), 4.
Centraal Plan Bureau (2002), and 5. Euro notes and coins were not available before
January 2002.
41Figure 1: Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices for the EU12
42Figure 2: Restaurants and cafes component of HICP for EU12
43Figure 3: Annualized monthly restaurant price inﬂa t i o ni nt h r e e‘ t r e a t m e n t ’
and three ‘control’ countries
44Figure 4: DKW menu cost distribution
45Figure 5: Two most important equilibrium dynamics mechanisms
46Figure 6: Calvo model
Figure 7: Calvo-Taylor hybrid and DKW
47Figure 8: Augmented DKW, allowing for endogenous adoption of Euro
Figure 9: Implied adoption curve of the Euro
48Figure 10: Implied path of fraction of ﬁrms adjusting their prices
49